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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FREDERICK MAY & CO., INC. 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
W. PRESCOTT DUNN and 
TRACY COLLINS TRUST 
COMPANY, a Banking 
Corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9356 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant-respondent Dunn (hereinafter 
referred to as defendant), takes exception to many 
of the statements that plaintiff claims to be estab-
lished facts. However, comments will be made as 
to only those statemls whi~h C)J'e possibly material. 
AI dd. . l f .A(-~ l so, a 1 tiona ac w-re necessary to proper y pre-
sent the issue to this Court. 
The first possibly material misstatement by the 
plaintiff appears 'at page 2 of appellant's brief, 
wherein it is stated: 
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"This agreement provided for a $25,000.00 
broker's fee, to be divided equally between the 
two brokers in the event of a sale procured 
and arranged by them, said division to be 
after first deducting plaintiff's expenses 
(Dunn Dep. p. 3) ." 
This statement is a distortion of the testimony 
of the defendant. The phrase " ... in the event of 
a sale procured and arranged by them ... " is com-
pletely contrary to the cited testimony, which was 
that the commission was only to be divided provided 
the plain tiff secured the purchaser, and, if the pro-
perty was sold locally or by someone with whom the 
plaintiff had nothing to do, the plaintiff was not 
to participate in the commission. 
At page 2 of plaintiff's brief, the statement 
that " ... he (plaintiff) contacted S. & H., as well 
as Guberman, to let them know he was looking for 
a buyer for Keith O'Brien," is inferentially incon-
sistent with the facts, since the inference is that 
S. & H. was being contacted as a possible buyer. 
The fact is that any contact with S. & H. relative 
to Guberman pertained to S. & H. backing Guber-
man, and it only consisted of a phone call (May 
Dep. pp. 7-8) (Answer of plaintiff to Interrogatory 
# 1, R. 44-45) . 
At page 3 of plaintiff's brief, the statement: 
"Since Mr. May had contacted S. & H. before, 
he was notified by Dunn that he should again 
contact S. & H. and arrange for meetings, 
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etc., to work out a deal. Thus, extensive and 
continual negoti'ations were carried on be-
tween Mr. May and S. & H., both in New York 
City and in Salt Lake City, until approximate-
ly June, 1956. At this time talks were broken 
off as substantially all the ground had been 
covered. (May Dep. pp. 16-24) ." 
is inconsistent, misleading and a distortion of the 
facts, in that inferences are created to the effect 
that plaintiff was negotiating extensively and con-
tinuously with S. & H. as a purchaser. 
The facts are that plaintiff contacted S. & H. 
at the request of the defendant because S. & H. had 
previously told the defendant th'a:t they would be 
interested in backing either one of two men in the 
purchase of the capital stock of Keith O'Brien (R. 
45). Any contact that plaintiff had with S. & H. 
was, in the one instance, by direction of the defen-
dant Dunn (May Dep. pp. 6, 25) ( R. 45), and in 
every instance, S. & H. was in the role of a backer 
for ·another prospective purchaser (May Dep. pp. 
7-8) (R. 44-45) (May Dep. pp. 18, 19, 24, 25, 26). 
At page 4 of plaintiff's brief, the statement is 
made to the effect that a sale had been made to 
S. & H., with whom the plaintiff had been nego-
tiating all along. The inference from the statement 
is inconsistent with the facts, in that it implies 
negoti'ation by plaintiff with S. & H. as a possible 
purchaser, which is not the fact, and continuous 
negotiation by plaintiff with S. & H. up to the date 
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of sale. The latter is also inconsistent with plaintiff's 
testimony, who testified that at the termination 
of the second Riordan transaction, and after plain-
tiff left Salt Lake City, that he didn't talk to S. & H. 
any more, and that it was ended as far as plain-
tiff and S. & H. was concerned (May Dep. p. 26). 
Further at page 4 of plaintiff's brief, the testimony 
of Dunn is distorted in that plaintiff describes the 
$11,000.00 payment to be a commission, and the 
testimony is that it was a voluntary payment. 
Factually, the plaintiff's connections and con-
tacts with S. & H. were as follows: 
Plaintiff's first contact with S. & H. was in 
May, 1954, when the president of that company 
talked over the telephone with the plaintiff to soli-
cit his support in discouraging Mr. Guberm'an from 
considering the purchase of Keith O'Brien, Inc. 
stock, since the S. & H. Company was not interested 
in backing Mr. Guberman in this purchase and 
wanted Mr. Guberman to concentrate on his busi-
ness in Colorado Springs (May Dep. p. 8) ( R. 45). 
With the exception of the Guberman incident, al-
most two years previously, plaintiff's only other 
contact with S. & H. was in March of 1956, at the 
direction of the defendant, and this was in connec-
tion with the fact that S. & H. had indicated to the 
defendant their interest in backing either one of 
two men in the purchase of the capital stock of 
Keith O'Brien ( R. 4'5) (May Dep. pp. 6, 25) . 
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A Mr. Riordan first entered the picture in 
October, 1953 (May Dep. p.13), at which time he and 
the plaintiff came to Salt Lake City to negotiate 
with defendant for the purchase of the Keith O'Brien 
stock. The negotiations failed and the purchase was 
not consummated (May Dep. p. 15). 
Mr. Riordan's next appearance in this mat-
ter occurred in April, 1956, when S. & H. indicated 
that they were willing to consider backing Riordan 
on the Keith O'Brien deal (May Dep. p. 18). The 
plaintiff, Riordan and the S. & H. group came to 
Salt Lake City June 12, 1956, (May Dep. p. 20), 
for the purpose of considering the deal and to draw 
up the papers (May Dep. p. 23). The transaction 
\vas not consummated (May Dep. p. 25) and nego-
tiations terminated on or about June 19, 1956 (R. 
28, 36). From and after June 19, 1'956, the plain-
tiff had no further talks with S. & H., which had 
never been regarded a:s a principal, but only as a 
potential backer (R. 415) (May Dep. pp. 7, 8, 18, 
19, 24, 25, 26). The Keith O'Brien stock was sold 
to S. & H. on July 27, 1956 (R. 28) (Plaintiff's 
Exh. 2). 
Additionally, the facts are that plaintiff acted 
as a broker under a general non-exclusive brokerage 
listing (May Dep. p. 5) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1), 
and Tracy-Collins Trust Company did not partici-
pate in the sale (Carter Dep. pp. 3, 4, 8, 9). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING 
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
ACTING AS A BROKER UNDER A GENERAL OR 
NON-EXCLUSIVE BROKERAGE LISTING. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING 
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT 
THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE OF THE 
CAPITAL STOCK OF KEITH O'BRIEN, INC. 
POINT III. 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING 
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT TRACY-COLLINS TRUST 
COMPANY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SALE 
OF THE CAPITAL STOCK OF KEITH O'BRIEN, INC. 
POINT IV. 
EVEN ASSUMING THAT AT SOME POINT S. & H. 
ADOPTED THE ROLE OF A PROSPECTIVE PUR-
CHASER, EVEN SO THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE 
REGARDING THE MATERIAL FACT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF ABANDONED HIS EFFORTS TO EFFEC-
TUATE THE SALE TO S. & H. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING 
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
ACTING AS A BROKER UNDER A GENERAL OR 
NON-EXCLUSIVE BROKERAGE LISTING. 
Generally, there are three types of brokerage 
listings; namely, the general, or non-exclusive listing 
which leaves the owner free to list his property with 
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other brokers, to sell it himself, or to withdraw it 
from the market. The second type involves the ex-
clusive agency wherein terms are inserted in the 
listing which provide that, for a stated period, the 
owner will not deal with other brokers, yet he may 
sell the property himself without liability. The third 
type embodies the exclusive right to sell, in which 
the owner precludes himself from selling the pro-
perty without paying the brokerage commission. 
As was stated in Tetrick v. Sloan, 339 P. 2d 613 
(Calif.) : 
"The authorization in the instant ease was 
analogous to a general listing. It gave plain-
tiff no designated time in which to procure a 
lessee and manfiestly did not give plaintiff 
an exclusive agency or exclusive right to lease. 
The authorization is completely silent in this 
respect. In SummeTs v. Freeman, 128 Cal. 
App. 2d 828, 831, 276 P. 2d 131, 133, the court 
said that "the general rule on exclusive agency 
agreements is stated as follows: 'A real estate 
broker's authority to sell real property is not 
exclusive, unless it is made so, by the contract 
of employment, in unequivocal terms or by 
necessary implication.' (Citation)" Had the 
parties contemplated such a relationship they 
surely would have so stated in the writing." 
In the deposition of Mr. Frederick S. May, 
plaintiff's President at page 5, appear the following 
questions and answers with regard to the brokerage 
agreement: 
Q. Did you make a memorandum of this 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
verbal understanding, written 1nemorandum, 
after you finished? 
A. I don't know if I did or not. I would 
say No. 
Q. You would say No. Did you consider 
that this agreement that you had with Mr. 
Dunn gave you an exclusive license, or an ex-
clusive right to make the sale, or not make the 
sale? 
A. I would say on a moral basis, yes, 
but I wouldn't say that he just outright agreed 
we were his exclusive agents. But the infer-
ences were very clear on his part and Mr. 
Collins' part. 
The plaintiff admitted that it was not " ... outright 
agreed that we were his exclusive agents." Further-
more, this proposition must be completely settled 
when consideration is given to plaintiff's Exhibit 1, 
wherein plaintiff confirms that this was a general 
or non-exclusive agency by virtue of the following 
language contained in said Exhibit, to-wit: 
"The above payment to be made, of course, 
with the proviso that if you should decide to 
sell the business to anyone suggested by us, 
that we would be entitled to the usual com-
mission on such a deal." 
In view of the plaintiff's testimony in the de-
position, and the language quoted from plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, there can be no doubt but that this was 
a general or non-exclusive brokerage listing, and as 
such the defendant, as the owner, was free to sell 
himself. 
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POINT II. 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING 
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT 
THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE OF THE 
CAPITAL STOCK OF KEITH O'BRIEN, INC. 
The defendant, in support of his motion for 
a sun1mary judgment, filed in the lower court a 
memorandum in support thereof (R. 53-72). It 
would appear that no useful purpose would be served 
by repeating in this brief the argument and authori-
ties which are already a part of the record. Indeed, 
as regards this point, the plaintiff-appellant's brief, 
at page 25, states that most of the citations of the 
defendant, filed in connection with the motion for 
summary judgment, express the general rule, which 
plaintiff readily accepts. 
For these reasons, repetition will be avoided, 
but the defendant respectfully urges this Court to 
read the said memorandum, since in addition to the 
authorities cited therein, there is further pertinent 
testimony of the plaintiff, not only as to this point, 
but to others. 
There are, however, a few further observations 
that may be made. One such pertains to the distorted 
and misleading statements that persistently appear 
throughout pl'aintiff's brief to the effect that the 
sale to S. & H. was consummated only a few days 
after the plaintiff completed his negotiations. For 
example, this Court's attention is directed to the 
following: 
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"The pleadings and depositions show that 
there was only a relatively few days between 
the concluding of negotiations and the signing 
of a deal by S. & H. . . . Then, almost im-
mediately, without his knowledge, S. & H. was 
suddenly signing on the dotted line." (Plain-
tiff's brief, p. 15) 
(The first quoted statement is utterly and com-
pl~tely inconsistent with the pleadings and deposi-
tions, as defendant will later 'Show.) 
Other examples are: 
'' ... with their becoming sole purchaser a few 
days after his last meeting with them." 
(Plaintiff's brief, p. 19) 
''Mr. May contacted the ultimate buyer in 
this case and negotiated with it over many 
months, right down to a date within only a 
few days of the date the transaction was com-
pleted ... It is apparently during those few 
days between the time Mr. May finished up 
the negotiations with the buyer and the time 
of the actual closing ... " (Plaintiff's brief, 
p. 2'3). 
"He had found a buyer and conducted nego-
tiations with that buyer right up to just be-
fore the signing on the dotted line." (Plain-
tiff's brief, p. 24) 
"This is particularly so when it is shown that 
they bought only a few days following the 
end of a long period of negotiations conducted 
by the plaintiff ... " (Plaintiff's brief, p. 27) 
This much is certain. In plain tiff''S second 
amended complaint (R. 28), it is alleged that the 
10 
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conference, wherein Riordan was the potential pur-
chaser and S. & H. the backer, and at which plain-
tiff, among others, was present, terminated on or 
about June 19, 1956, and the defendant in answer 
to the second amended complaint, admitted that the 
conference terminated on or about June 19, 1956 
(R. 36). It is a further fact that the agreement of 
purchase between the defendant and S. & H. was 
executed July 27, 1956 ('Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). A 
period of 38 days is not just a few days, a relatively 
few days, or a period of time at the inception of 
which and 38 days later one could say it happened 
almost immediately. And so, when the plaintiff 
states in his brief at page 15 that: 
" ... the pleadings and depositions show that 
there was only a relatively few days between 
the concluding of negoti;ations and the signing 
of the deal by S. & H .... ", 
unless 38 days is "only a relatively few days" such 
statement is a distortion of the facts. 
It is further a fact that after June 19, 1956, 
plaintiff did nothing more, since he testified: 
Q. Did you talk to S. & H. at the time 
you were talking with the W ohls? 
A. No, tha:t ended it as far as I was 
concerned with S. & H. 
Q. After you left Salt Lake City, when 
the second Riordan transaction blew up, you 
didn't talk to S. & H. any more? 
11 
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A. That is correct. They were never 
regarded as a principal. They were only re-
garded as a potential backer. (May Dep. p. 
26)' 
and it is also a fact that the plaintiff, while attend-
ing the second negotiations in which Riordan was a 
principal, testified to the following: 
Q. You didn't have any conversation 
out here that you heard, about S. & H. buying 
the store alone, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. That was never mentioned? 
A. No. 
Q. The only thing you were out here for 
was to see if you could put Riordan in as 
purchaser? (May Dep. p. 24). 
Plaintiff's brief at page 20 admits one basic 
fact and then poses two entirely immaterial ques-
tions when it is stated: 
"The evidence in the record is claimed by the 
defendant to prove that S. & H. played the 
role of backer for someone else right up to 
June, 1'956. However, the question is: Did 
they play that role in good faith? Also, was 
the defendant acting in good faith in pur-
porting to believe them?" 
The basic fact that is now 'admitted in plain-
tiff's brief is that S. & H. was in the role of a 
"backer" right up to June, 1956. 
Defendant doesn't know whether S. & H. played 
the role in good faith or bad faith, and whichever 
12 
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vvay they played it is immaterial. The point is, S. 
& H. was in the role of ;a backer and the record is 
clear that previously S. & H. had acted as a backer 
for one Morris Guberman. Moreover, wherein was 
there any duty of defendant to question what role 
S. & H. was playing. Isn't the more logical and 
reasonable answer: Why didn't the plaintiff take 
some active steps to sell or attempt to sell the Keith 
O'Brien stock to S. & H.; why didn't the plaintiff 
take some active steps to convert or attempt to 
convert S. & H. from the role of a backer to a pur-
chaser? There may be a number of reasons why 
plaintiff didn't, all of which the defendant agrees 
are immaterial, but the one solid factual point is 
that the plaintiff himself always considered, and 
as of the date of his brief still does consider, S. & H. 
as a backer, and never as a possible purchaser. And 
plaintiff did not do anything to convert or attempt 
to convert S. & H. to the role of a purchaser. There 
is not one shred of testimony that shows wherein 
plaintiff did anything to influenceS. & H. as a pur-
chaser, and this in the face of the very direct ques-
tion, namely : 
"What do you consider you did to get Sperry 
& Hutchinson into this transaction?" (May 
Dep. p. 30) 
The testimony of the plaintiff and of the plain-
tiff alone is plain and irrefutable. S. & H. was never 
considered by plaintiff other than ;as a backer, and 
13 
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in the light of the decisions, plaintiff cannot claim 
to be the efficient or procuring cause of the sale. 
Plaintiff's brief is replete with ill-founded con-
clusions. To mention one more, at page 24 the state-
ment is made: 
"'Thus, Mr. M;ay, the agent, had already per-
formed, according to the agency agreement. 
He had found a buyer and conducted nego-
tiations with that buyer right up to just be-
fore the signing on the dotted line." 
Let us examine how many things are wrong 
with the quoted statement. In the first place, it is 
establi'Shed that the plaintiff went to see the offi-
cers of S. & H. at the request of the defendant 
Dunn. And the reason defendant sent the plaintiff 
to see S. & H. was because S. & H. had indicated 
to the defendant a willingness to back one of sev-
eral n1en in the purchase of Keith O'Brien stock. 
Secondly, even if the plaintiff had found S. 
& H., he talked with them ;as a backer, and he was 
not engaged for that job. To say that Mr. May 
"had already performed, according to the agency 
agreement" is erroneous. If this is the case, it is 
tantamount to saying that when negotiations con-
cluded on June 19, 1956, the plaintiff, May, had 
performed his part of the agency contract and was 
en ti tied to a commission, even though up to said 
date S. & H. was only in the role of a backer, and 
had never been approached 'by the plaintiff to be-
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
come a purchaser. And that, in essence, is the sum 
and substance of plaintiff's case. 
The plain fact of the matter is that the plaintiff 
spent a considerable amount of time and effort in 
attempting to effectuate a s'ale to Riordan. Riordan 
and the plaintiff were present at Salt Lake City 
on two different occasions. On Riordan's second 
visit, the officers of S. & H. were present also. As 
has been heretofore detailed, there was never any 
conversation nor any mention about S. & H. buying, 
and after Riordan and S. & H. broke apart, Riordan 
was introduced to Eccles at the bank, to see what 
assistance Riordan could get there (May Dep. p. 24) . 
POINT III. 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING 
THE MATERIAL FACT THAT TRACY-COLLINS TRUST 
COMPANY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SALE 
OF THE CAPITAL STOCK OF KEITH O'BRIEN, INC. 
This point is only rna terial in the event that as 
a matter of fact the plaintiff and Tracy-Collins 
Company were engaged as co-brokers in the sale of 
the stock of Keith O'Brien, Inc. If they were co-
brokers in the complete sense, then of course i'f either 
procured a purchaser, the commission earned would 
be split between the two brokers. 
The defendant contends that the plaintiff and 
Tracy-Collins Trust Company were not co-brokers 
in the complete sense. In this brief, the defendant 
15 
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has, with two exceptions, refrained from citing any 
testimony of the defendant to establish any of the 
facts. In both instances, the testimony of the de-
fendant was first raised in plaintiff's brief. One 
exception was caused by the plaintiff at page 2 of 
his brief misstating the testimony of the defendant. 
Inasmuch as the plaintiff first alluded to this testi-
mony, it is again pointed out that the defendant 
testified to the effect that the plaintiff was only to 
receive one-half of the commission in case he brought 
the purchaser in; that if it were sold locally or by 
someone plaintiff had nothing to do with, plaintiff 
was not to participate. 
Another i tern of evidence which tends to estab-
lish that the plaintiff and Tracy-Collins Trust Com-
pany were not co-brokers in the sense herein de-
fined has previously been referred to, and that is 
plain tiff's Exhibit 1. Regarding the contents of this 
Exhibit, the defendant recognizes that the phrase 
"anyone suggested by us" might be interpreted to 
include Tracy-Collins Trust Company. The more 
reason'able interpretation, however, would seem to 
include only the plaintiff in the word "us", and cer-
tainly in other places of the Exhibit the word "us" 
refers solely to the plaintiff. 
And there i's still additional testimony which 
sheds some light on this question, and that is found 
at page 5 of May's deposition, where the plaintiff 
testified as follows : 
16 
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Q. Did you understand that - suppos-
ing Tracy Collins Trust Company had lined 
up a purchaser, would you have participated 
in the commission? 
A. They assured me they were not work-
ing on it, that there was no one else on it at 
this time, and we could work, because I would 
have not taken it to have gone on any race-
track. 
Q. You were the one they were solely 
looking to, to line up a purchaser? 
A. They were willing to work with me, 
expecting I would come through, hoping I 
would. 
But assuming the plaintiff and Tracy-Collins 
were co-brokers in the sense that a sale by either 
would result in division of the commission, never-
theless, the testimony of Mr. Carter of the Tracy-
Collins Trust Company is that Tracy-Collins had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the sale. And there 
cannot be any issue as to this material fact, because 
the plaintiff has in no way introduced, either by 
affidavit, deposition or admitted pleading, anything 
to the contrary. Absent any evidence to refute the 
testimony of Mr. Carter, there is, of course, no 
genuine issue of material fact on this point. 
POINT IV. 
EVEN ASSUMING THAT AT SOME POINTS. & H. 
ADOPTED THE ROLE OF A PROSPECTIVE PUR-
CHASER, EVEN SO THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE 
REGARDING THE MATERIAL FACT THAT THE 
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PLAINTIFF ABANDONED HIS EFFORTS TO EFFEC-
TUATE THE SALE TO S. & H. 
The defendant does not believe that as a matter 
of fact the plaintiff abandoned his efforts to cause 
S. & H. to purchase the Keith O'Brien stock; this for 
the plain and obvious reason that you cannot aban-
don something upon which you have never worked. 
For instance, any and all efforts expended by plain-
tiff, so far as pertaining to S. & H., were to the ex-
tent of interesting S. & H. as a backer, and thus, 
if plaintiff abandoned anything, it was an abandon-
ment of hi's efforts to procure S. & H. as a backer, 
not as a purchaser. 
But assuming that for any reason it should 
be conceded that S. & H. throughout the period 
of the negotiations was in the role of purchaser, 
then in that event, the plaintiff must be held to have 
abandoned his efforts to sell the stock to S. & H. 
when he ceased working on the transaction on June 
1'9, 1'956. Authorities on this proposition are set 
forth in the memorandum ( R. 53-72). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it should be realized that this 
lawsuit is basically very simple. The defendant Dunn 
entered into a general or non-exclusive listing with 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the plaintiff, agreeing to pay a commission if plain-
tiff procured a purchaser for the Keith O'Brien 
stock. The plaintiff had some collateral dealings 
with S. & H., regarding whether or not it would 
financially back a Morris Guberman or a Mr. Rior-
dan. Plaintiff ceased talking with S. & H. on June 
19, 1956, and some 38 days thereafter, S. & H. pur-
chased the stock from the defendant Dunn. At no 
time did the plaintiff urge S. & H. to buy the stock, 
nor did the plaintiff participate at all or to any 
degree with the transactions that evolved between 
June 19, 1956, and the final date of purchase, July 
27, 1956. 
The question is whether or not the plaintiff, 
as a broker, was the efficient agent or procuring 
cause of the sale. Did the means employed by him 
and his efforts result in the sale? Were his efforts 
the predominiating effective cause? It is not suffi-
cient where the efforts are merely an indirect, inci-
dental, or contributing cause or one of the links in 
a chain of causes. 
The question of a litigant's intent is often a 
decisive factor in a lawsuit. If plaintiff prevails, 
the result is to award him a commission because 
stock was sold to a third party who was never re-
garded by plaintiff as a principal, but only as a 
potential backer (May Dep. p. 26). 
The defendant contends th'at there is no genuine 
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issue as to any material fact, and as a matter of 
law the judgment of the lower court must be af-
firmed, since plaintiff was not the procuring cause 
of the sale. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE and MANGUM 
Attorneys for Respondent 
817 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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